On November 5, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Manhattan unsealed an indictment charging three men, Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan and Guy Sheetrit, with a scheme that allegedly took at least $129 million from companies around the world between July 2024 and February 2026. According to the indictment, the group used AI to copy the voices, and at times the faces, of real CEOs, and posed as lawyers at some of the world's largest law firms.
According to the charges, no systems were hacked and no passwords were stolen. Instead, employees who were authorized to send money were convinced to send it.
This article walks through the scheme the way a finance team would experience it, and shows how each common safety procedure could be turned around.
Who They Targeted
The indictment says the group "typically targeted" people "who worked in accounting roles" and had "sufficient authority" to approve a large wire transfer. They did not need to break into the payment system. They needed the person who already had the keys.
The Playbook, Step by Step
"We need to loop you into a deal we've been working on. The companies involved require you to sign an NDA - see attached. Once you've signed it, could you please call [the attorney], our legal representative at [the law firm] on [phone number]. He will assist you in scheduling a compliance call for later today, and will provide further details."
Every Control, and How It Was Turned Around
Companies that move millions of dollars have safety procedures. The victims here included two hospital systems, a bank and a mutual fund company, organizations expected to have real controls. The indictment does not describe each company's procedures, but based on the scheme it describes, this is how common controls can be turned around:
Why a Signature Request Proves Nothing About the Sender
E-signature services in general are built to protect the person sending a document. They prove a document wasn't changed after signing and keep a record of who signed it and when. Identity checks, such as ID verification or SMS codes, are there to verify the signer, and the sender decides whether to use them. That is how these services are designed to work.
In this scheme, the scammers were the sender. The checks were never pointed at them, and the employee's signature was genuine. A sender's display name is simply what the account holder enters, so a signature request shows that a document was sent and signed, not who really sent it.
The signature step wasn't there to prove anything. It made the request look formal, and signing an NDA committed the employee to secrecy before money was ever mentioned. Before signing, check the sender's actual email address in the request details, and whether it matches your company's own domain.
The Script: Insider-Trading Rules as the Cover Story
According to prosecutors, Soall, who mainly posed as UK attorneys, kept a handwritten script titled "Lawyer Call." The indictment quotes it:
"Target company, company you are acquiring is publicly listed. Legal + regulatory perspective confidentiality is a greater priority . . . target company project shareholders + also greater security concerns around insider trading. Sure you understand all this? [] XYZ said you'd probably ask if anyone else had been NDA'd . . . answer is not yet . . . although that is likely to change in coming days . . . internal memo coming days."
("XYZ" stands for the impersonated CEO.)
This is the center of the attack. Confidentiality around the acquisition of a public company is real: people who learn about a deal early are routinely told not to discuss it, because of insider-trading rules. Anyone who has worked in finance has heard that instruction. That is exactly why it works as cover. The script even anticipates the obvious question and answers it before the employee can act on it.
The Pressure From Above
There is one more control the scheme defeated, and it is the one most companies rely on without writing it down: an experienced employee's sense that something is wrong.
In finance, the person who doubts a payment is often the person with the least power in the conversation. When the instruction comes from the CEO, saying "I don't feel right about this" means arguing with the boss, on a deal you've been told is confidential and urgent. The scheme was built to win that argument. The voice on the call sounded like the CEO's. The lawyer used the name of an attorney at a famous firm. The secrecy was presented as a legal requirement. An employee who hesitated had nothing objective to point to, only a feeling.
The One That Got Away
Among the victims, the indictment lists six companies that lost money:
A seventh case is the most useful lesson. In October 2024, the group tried to take about $2.85 million from a major investment bank in New York. The employee was convinced and authorized the wire, but the bank's back office stopped it before it was sent.
The person on the call was fooled. A second check, by people who were not in the conversation and not under the CEO's pressure, was not.
Why Procedures Alone Aren't Enough
Companies like these have safety procedures. A scheme like this one is designed to get around each of them, because each procedure depends on one person making the right call under pressure, with nothing objective to rely on.
Rules still matter. Confidentiality should never replace approval, and the second approver should never be part of the conversation. But rules can't tell a cloned voice from a real one, an edited document from a genuine one, or a real lawyer from someone using his name.
That takes technology: tools that check the calls, documents and identities behind high-value payments, automatically and continuously, so the decision never rests on one person's gut feeling. The New York bank was saved by a second check. The right system makes that second check happen every time.
How DeFake Helps
DeFake is built to fight this new generation of fraud: AI-cloned voices, faces, documents and pictures. DeFake is a forensic and provenance engine that gates fraudulent transactions.
Protect your payments before the next call comes in. Talk to us about DeFake for your finance team
If you think your organization was targeted by the scheme described here, the FBI asks that you report it at tips.fbi.gov.
Sources
Legal note: The charges in the indictment are accusations. All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law. Attorneys for Guy Sheetrit have said he has no connection to the matter, according to news reports.